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Analytics I.31*
Justin Vlasits
In the first book of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle sets out, for the first time
in Greek philosophy, a logical system. It consists of a deductive system
(I.4-22), meta-logical results (I.23-26), and a method for finding and giving
deductions (I.27-29) that can apply in “any art or science whatsoever” (I.30).
After this, Aristotle compares this method with Plato’s method of division,
a procedure designed to find essences of natural kinds through systematic
classification.
This critical comparison in APr I.31 raises an interpretive puzzle: how
can Aristotle reasonably juxtapose two methods that differ so much in their
aims and approach? What can be gained by doing so? Previous interpreters
have failed to show how this comparison is legitimate or what important
point Aristotle is making. The goal of this paper is to resolve the puzzle.
In resolving this puzzle we not only learn more about the relationship be-
tween division and the syllogistic in Aristotle. We will also learn something
about the motivation for the syllogistic itself, by seeing the role that it plays
in his philosophy of science.
I shall claim that Aristotle’s comparison makes sense once we view both
division and the syllogistic method as general, rigorous scientific methods
aimed at investigating part-whole relations between kinds. The point of
the criticisms is to show that his syllogistic method, unlike Platonic divi-
sion, allows the scientist to produce valid arguments, which are of crucial
importance to the scientific enterprise. With the methods situated in this
wider context, Aristotle’s critical comparison doesn’t just make sense, it
serves a crucial function within his overall project: the comparison with
division highlights how the valid arguments produced by the syllogistic
method are valuable in science. These valid arguments could not be pro-
duced by the method of division. Far from being an anomalous chapter
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1
in the treatise,1 APr I.31 highlights the broader philosophical and scientific
interest of Aristotle’s logical work.
The plan for this paper is, first, to introduce the puzzle of Aristotle’s
comparison and show how previous attempts to resolve it are inadequate
(§1). Then, I will argue that Aristotle’s comparison is legitimate because
both methods are intended to contribute towards a methodology for sci-
ence that 1) applies in any domain and 2) is rigorous (§2). Not only are they
similar as methods, the sorts of claims that each method yields are claims
about part-whole (mereological) relations among kinds (§3). Finally, I will
show how the common framework resolves the puzzle and helps show
what Aristotle thought was important about the syllogistic method (§4).
1 The Puzzle of APr I.31
Here I will give a brief functional account of Plato’s method of division,
introduce Aristotle’s syllogistic method and, in doing so, explain the puzzle
of Aristotle’s critical comparison. I cannot hope to give either topic full
discussion, but rather to give enough of a sense of what these two methods
are that we can sensibly ask why Aristotle might compare them.2
1.1 Division
Plato, in several of his late dialogues (especially the Phaedrus, Sophist, States-
man, and Philebus), develops the method of division in part to solve the
longstanding Socratic problem of answering the “What is F?” question.
This is a procedure for creating classifications by dividing more general
kinds into increasingly specific ones. The most important use of the method
for our purposes (although possibly not its only use) is to seek the nature
or essence of a target natural kind. In the Statesman, for example, to find
1As suggested by, among others, Maier (1896) II.2, p. 77 n. 2.
2For more on Platonic division, see Moravcsik (1973); Brown (2010); Gill (2010); Rickless
(2010); Crivelli (2012), pp.13-27. For comprehensive overviews of Aristotle’s syllogistic and
its general philosophical significance for Aristotle, Maier (1896) II.1; Solmsen (1929); Ross
(1964), pp. 1-86; Smith (1989) pp. xiii-xxviii; Leszl (2004). There has been considerable work
on technical issues surrounding the syllogistic, detailed discussions of which can be found
in, e.g., Lear (1980); Patzig (1968); Malink (2013). There is a vast literature on the relation-
ship between Aristotle’s syllogistic and the theory of science in the Posterior Analytics. See
especially Maier (1896) II.1-2; Barnes (1981); Crubellier (2008); Mansion (1961); McKirahan
(1992), pp. 149-163; Smith (1982b,a); Solmsen (1929), pp. 78-150. While I will at times refer
to the Posterior Analytics, space does not permit me to fully integrate the views in APr I.31
with APo.
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out what statesmanship is (i.e., the nature of statesmanship), the interlocu-
tors begin by agreeing that it is a kind of knowledge. Then they distinguish
kinds of knowledge in stages, first dividing knowledge into practical and
theoretical, then dividing theoretical knowledge in turn, until they arrive
at statesmanship.
The method of division promises a way to systematically search for
essence by situating the target kind in relation to other kinds in the same
domain. By understanding how statesmanship is fundamentally similar to
and different from other kinds of knowledge, one can hone in on the thing
itself. By setting it down as a kind of theoretical knowledge, for example,
Plato can distinguish statesmanship from all the manual arts in one go.
The method of division provides a holistic way of searching for essence:
if one can “carve nature at its joints” (Phdr 265e), one will find out about
the essences of a number of related kinds at once. This procedure allows
an inquirer to come to know the essences of kinds which are ontologically
fundamental, since the comparison does not aim at reducing the essences to
something else.3
1.2 Syllogistic
Aristotle describes his syllogistic method in Prior Analytics I.27-30, where
he shows that there is a way to discover syllogisms with the desired conclu-
sions by sorting any set of premises into six different lists. The end result
is an algorithm that searches these lists and returns a syllogism with the
desired conclusion. Depending on the logical form of the conclusion, only
certain lists will be relevant. In what follows, when I use the term “syl-
logistic”, I am referring to this method of finding and giving syllogisms,
although the term is used in the contemporary literature to refer more gen-
erally to Aristotle’s logical theory.4
To see how the method works, let’s work through an example. Suppose
we want to scientifically demonstrate that no human flies. The first thing
we need to do is sort true premises into various lists depending on their
form. The relevant lists for getting this particular conclusion are:
1. Propositions of the form “No human is X” with different values of X:
winged, immortal, etc.
3The idea that knowledge is holistic in the way described above may be present in the
Socratic dialogues. I am here claiming that it is only with the method of division, which
rises to prominence later in Plato’s career, that we have a satisfactory way of achieving this
holistic knowledge.
4For the phrase “syllogistike methodos” see Alex Aphr in Top 2, 1-2.
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2. Propositions of the form “Every human is X”: mammal, animal, etc.
3. Propositions of the form “No flyer is X”: fish, horse, etc.
4. Propositions of the form “Every flyer is X”: winged, perceiver, verte-
brate, animal, etc.5
Premises such as “Some human is seated” or “Not every flyer is aquatic”
are notoriously not considered at all, and because Aristotle claims that this
system is sufficient for finding any deduction, he is committed to the claim
that one only needs universal premises for deductions.6 Aristotle’s pro-
cedure looks for a pair of premises with the same term substituted for X
either from lists 1 and 4 or from lists 2 and 3. If there is such a pair, you can
construct a sound argument for the conclusion. In the example, we could
use the propositions:
1. No human is winged. (list 1)
2. Every flyer is winged. (list 4)
3. No human is a flyer. (desired conclusion)
While this is a trivial case, the method is quite powerful. It is a highly
tractable procedure that always finds a syllogism with the desired con-
clusion whenever there are premises which could produce a syllogism and
never outputs an argument that is not a syllogism.7 Aristotle himself gets
quite excited about his method:
5The two other lists, not relevant for this example, would be propositions of the form
“Every X is a human” and “Every X is a flyer”. Aristotle proves that no pairs of premises
other than those he discussed can together produce a syllogism (APr 44b25-37). In this
particular case, the lists are not relevant because there is no way to use them in any of the
three sorts of syllogisms (Celarent, Cesare, and Camestres) that can bring about the desired
universal negative conclusion (APr I.26). Note that Aristotle describes these lists as lists of
terms for which the corresponding proposition is true. However, it is equivalent to work
with lists of propositions and the point is easier to understand.
6In this example problem, they would be of no help, since a universal conclusion
requires both premises to be universal (APr I.24), but Aristotle does not use particular
premises in proving particular conclusions either, relying instead on Darapti and Felapton.
On this problem, see Smith (1989), pp. 152-3 and Striker (2009), pp. 200-1.
7As described by Aristotle, this algorithm is “totally correct” in the technical sense used
in computer science, because, given a set of premises and a possible conclusion, it will
either output a syllogism of the conclusion from the premises or the result that there is no
syllogism of that conclusion.
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The method is one and the same for all things, both concerning
philosophy as well as any skill or learning whatever. (APr I.30
46a3-4)8
The method can be applied in any argumentative context. While the argu-
ments that one gives on a particular occasion differ depending on the sub-
ject matter (physics, biology) and intent (scientific demonstration, dialec-
tically effective argument), the principles behind these arguments (what
makes them valid) and the ways of finding them are the same.
The basic idea is that any scientist, philosopher, or technician inquir-
ing into any subject matter with the aim of getting truth ought to first dis-
cover true premises of these particular kinds and then produce syllogisms
for the conclusions desired. Demonstrations are syllogisms the possession
of which gives us knowledge, since they have true, explanatory premises.
This means that the syllogistic method plays an important role in our pur-
suit of knowledge, even though it is not sufficient for generating scientific
knowledge.
1.3 The Puzzle
These two methods seem incredibly different. First, they have very differ-
ent goals. The goal of the method of division is an account of the essence of
a target natural kind, which Aristotle and later philosophers would call a
“definition”. The goal of the syllogistic is a deductive argument for a given
conclusion. That conclusion need not state the essence of anything at all—in
the example above, “not being a flyer” is not a part of human nature, even
if it is necessarily true. Most strikingly, division has as its goal something
that must be true, which is neither necessary for the conclusion of a syllo-
gism nor for a syllogism itself (which is not even a candidate for truth or
falsity).9 While we want our syllogisms to have true premises (and hence a
true conclusion) in demonstrative contexts, in dialectical contexts, we only
want to have premises in accordance with belief. So a perfectly good use of
the syllogistic method might conclude a falsehood from falsehoods.
8῾Η μὲν οὖν ὁδὸς κατὰ πάντων ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ περὶ φιλοσ=οφίαν καὶ περὶ τέχνην ὁποιανοῦν καὶ
μάθημα·
9It might be objected that division aims at essences, which are also not candidates for
truth or falsity. Even on this interpretation, however, there is a big difference in content
between division and syllogistic, which doesn’t aim at essences any more than it aims at
essential predications. But Plato also does use terms like “true” and its cognates to describe
the goals of division (Sph 268c-d). Moreover, it cannot simply be the goal to find essences,
but to find the essence of the target kind. It can only be successful if the essential features or
definientia are essential true of the target.
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The methods also take very different routes. The method of division be-
gins with a genus and progressively narrows it down until one reaches the
target kind. The syllogistic method consists of two steps, neither of which is
anything like this. The first step organizes premises into six lists and takes
premises for a given deduction from two of these lists. The second con-
structs a deductive argument for the conclusion with those premises. In
neither case does the user of the syllogistic method “narrow down”. Nor
does the divider ever seek premises for a deductively valid argument or
give such an argument.
Most striking, perhaps, is that it might be objected that division and syl-
logistic seem to yield very different sorts of claims.10 The method of divi-
sion investigates definitions, which are a kind of identity claim. Syllogistic,
by contrast, investigates quantificational claims. These claims differ signifi-
cantly in their syntactic structure, but also in their modal status. Definitions
require a very strong connection between the definiens and definiendum,
much stronger than even the modal propositions of Aristotle’s syllogistic.11
Even if Aristotle talks about definitions in terms of identity (e.g., in Topics
I.7) and predication (e.g., Topics I.4-5), he does not talk about them in quan-
tificational terms. That is to say, definitions do not fit into any of the four
types of proposition distinguished at the outset of the Prior Analytics.
Aristotle’s comparison of the two methods in Prior Analytics I.31 seems
so far-fetched that, instead of clarifying their connection, it reinforces the
impression that they are fundamentally different. He introduces his dis-
cussion by immediately finding fault with the fact that division does not
do what the syllogistic does:
It is easy to see that division of genera is a small part of the
aforementioned method. For division is a kind of weak syllo-
gism. For, 1) it asks for what it ought to show and 2) it de-
duces something higher up. This first point eluded all those
using division and they tried to persuade us that a demonstra-
tion concerning essence and the what it is can come about, with
the result that they neither understood what in particular12 it is
possible that those dividing13 deduce, nor that it was possible
in the way in which we said. (APr 46a31-39)14
10See Moravscik (2004) for a development of this worry.
11For example, it is necessary that all and only triangles have angles summing to two
right angles, but that is not the definition of a triangle.
12Reading ὅ τι instead of ὅτι.
13Reading διαιρουμένουςwith Waitz over διαιρουμένοις (Ross) διαιρουμένοι (Cherniss).
14῞Οτι δ’ ἡ διὰ τῶν γενῶν διαίρεσ=ις μικρόν τι μόριόν ἐσ=τι τῆς εἰρημένης μεθόδου, ῥᾴδιον ἰδεῖν·
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In this passage, Aristotle both announces the substance of his criticism and
describes how the users of division got in such trouble. The line of thought
Aristotle attributes to the dividers is:
1. Divisions are demonstrations of essence.
2. So, divisions deduce essence.
While Plato does occasionally call divisions “demonstrations” (e.g., Plt
273e, 277a, b), he isn’t obviously using the term in Aristotle’s sense, as in-
troducing a deductive argument of a special sort. The inference relies on
something Aristotle believes—namely that all demonstrations are deduc-
tions (APr I.1, APo I.2).15 Aristotle here is just assuming on the basis of
the word “demonstration” that the two methods try to deduce something,
and then arguing that, where division fails, syllogistic succeeds. But this
assumption seems totally unjustified. From the basic descriptions above,
division is a method for finding essences, syllogistic a method for finding
and giving valid arguments. However, Aristotle doesn’t provide us with
any reason to think that one of the methods is “part” of the other, or that a
division is a sort of “weak” syllogism. Understanding why Aristotle makes
these claims is one major question of this paper.
In addition to these polemical points, Aristotle has a number of precise
complaints against division, first appearing in 1 and 2 above. Importantly,
these precise complaints are meant to explain the sense in which division is
a weak syllogism and a small part of the syllogistic method, as can be seen
from how he links the first three sentences with “for”. Understanding these
precise claims, then, offers the surest route to understanding the polemics.
Aristotle ends up making four distinct claims in the body of the chapter:
1. Divisions are not deductions of the definitions they seek, because
the definition does not follow necessarily from the divider’s assump-
tions. Instead, the strongest claim deducible from the divider’s as-
sumptions is not of scientific interest. (46a31-46b25)
2. Division cannot demolish claims because it cannot deduce negative
propositions (cf. APr I.26). (46b26)
ἔσ=τι γὰρ ἡ διαίρεσ=ις οἷον ἀσ=θενὴς σ=υλλογισ=μός· ὃ μὲν γὰρ δεῖ δεῖξαι αἰτεῖται, σ=υλλογίζεται δ’
ἀεί τι τῶν ἄνωθεν. πρῶτον δ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἐλελήθει τοὺς χρωμένους αὐτῇ πάντας, καὶ πείθειν
ἐπεχείρουν ὡς ὄντος δυνατοῦ περὶ οὐσ=ίας ἀπόδειξιν γενέσ=θαι καὶ τοῦ τί ἐσ=τιν. ὥσ=τ’ οὔτε ὅ τι
ἐνδέχεται σ=υλλογίσ=ασ=θαι διαιρουμένους ξυνίεσ=αν, οὔτε ὅτι οὕτως ἐνεδέχετο ὥσ=περ εἰρήκαμεν.
15Could it be someone other than Plato? In §1.4, I will consider the possibility that Aris-
totle is referring to other members of the Academy.
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3. Division cannot deduce features that are not definitional such as ac-
cidents, properties, or genera. (46b27-8)
4. Division is useless in solving open problems, such as whether the
diagonal of a square is commensurable or not with its side. (46b28-
35)
Aristotle only argues for 1 and 4, treating 2 and 3 as common ground with
the practitioners of division, who only claim that their method establishes
definitions.
His argument for 1 begins with a general description of the problem
that division encounters. He had shown earlier (APr I.26) that every syl-
logism with a conclusion of the form “All A is B” has a middle term that
is between A and B in generality (46a39-b3). However, if we look at an
arbitrary division, this will not be the case:
For: let A stand for animal, B for mortal, Γ for immortal, and
Δ for human, whose account it is necessary to get. Then [the
divider] assumes all animal is either mortal or immortal: All
this (what would be A) is either B or Γ. Again the one who is
always dividing sets down that a human is an animal, so that he
assumes A belongs to Δ. On the one hand, there is a syllogism
that all Δ will be either B or Γ, so that necessarily human is
mortal or immortal, but it is not necessary that it is a mortal
animal, but asked. But this was what was necessary to deduce.
(APr 46b3-12)16
While we can conclude something trivial like “every human is either mor-
tal or immortal” on the basis of a division, there is clearly no way to argue
deductively for the desired conclusion that every human is mortal. The
only thing that the divider can do to get closer to her goal is to ask her in-
terlocutor to agree to the claim that every human is mortal (46a33-34). By
asking for this, the divider “begs the question” in the technical Aristotelian
sense by assuming the very claim under discussion. By showing that divi-
sion begs the question for an arbitrary case, Aristotle is entitled to conclude
in general that division cannot produce a syllogism of its target. This is the
16ἔσ=τω γὰρ ζῷον ἐφ’ οὗ Α, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἐφ’ οὗ Β, καὶ ἀθάνατον ἐφ’ οὗ Γ, ὁ δ’ ἄνθρωπος,
οὗ τὸν λόγον δεῖ λαβεῖν, ἐφ’ οὗ τὸ Δ. ἅπαν δὴ ζῷον λαμβάνει ἢ θνητὸν ἢ ἀθάνατον· τοῦτο δ’
ἐσ=τίν, ὃ ἂν ᾖ Α, ἅπαν εἶναι ἢ Β ἢ Γ. πάλιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀεὶ διαιρούμενος τίθεται ζῷον εἶναι,
ὥσ=τε κατὰ τοῦ Δ τὸ Α λαμβάνει ὑπάρχειν. ὁ μὲν οὖν σ=υλλογισ=μός ἐσ=τιν ὅτι τὸ Δ ἢ Β ἢ Γ
ἅπαν ἔσ=ται, ὥσ=τε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἢ θνητὸν μὲν ἢ ἀθάνατον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι, ζῷον θνητὸν δὲ οὐκ
ἀναγκαῖον, ἀλλ’ αἰτεῖται· τοῦτο δ’ ἦν ὃ ἔδει σ=υλλογίσ=ασ=θαι.
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sense in which division is a weak syllogism: it cannot deduce its goal, but
only the triviality Δ is Β or Γ.
This account of why division is a weak syllogism also explains, as we
expected it would, why the method of division is “a small part” of the
syllogistic method. Division is a weak syllogism because it can only deduce
a triviality. The syllogistic can deduce this triviality, but also much else. So
it is straightforward to think that division is a small part of the syllogistic
method. We now have an answer for what Aristotle means when he says
that division is a small part of the syllogistic and a weak syllogism.
Aristotle also argues for 4 on the basis of an example. Suppose that
we want to know whether the diagonal of a square is commensurable or
incommensurable with its side. The divider assumes that the diagonal is a
length and then divides length into commensurable or incommensurable.
But without having proven the theorem, the divider is stuck: where should
she put the “diagonal”? Division seems to offer no guidance on this.
In general, Aristotle’s criticisms in APr I.31 strongly suggest that Aris-
totle thinks division was intended to do what the syllogistic does (produce
valid arguments), but give no hint as to why anyone should expect this.
These methods seem to be, on their face, far too different to make such a
connection. This constitutes the major puzzle of this paper.
1.4 Previous resolutions of the puzzle
Previous commentators have failed to motivate Aristotle’s critical compar-
ison. They have taken three different approaches towards resolving this
puzzle.
The most common response is Confusion: one party of the debate
is simply confused about the relationship between the various methods.
Some commentators have pointed the finger at Aristotle, others at the de-
fenders of division.
Ebert and Nortmann (2007) claim that the fault lies with Aristotle him-
self:
Aristoteles’ Kritik dürfte aber auf einer falschen Voraussetzung
beruhen, denn die Methode der Dihairesis ist ein heuristisches
Verfahren zur Gewinnung einer Definition, nicht aber ein Ver-
fahren, bei dem eine Definition deduziert werden soll. (pp. 794-
795)
Diese Kritik des Aristoteles an der Dihairesis scheint un-
berechtigt. Denn das Verfahren wird bei Platon keineswegs
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deducktiv gebraucht, sondern immer so, daß ein Gegenstand,
dessen Eigenschaften bekannt sind, durch eine fortschreitende
Eingrenzung mit einer nächsthöheren Gattung und einem Un-
terscheidungsmerkmal ausgestattet wird, das ihn von anderen
Arten unterscheidet, die ebenfalls unter diese nächsthöhere
Gattung fallen. Gerade weil es bei dieser Methode nur um die
Gewinnung von Definitionen (i. S. v. Definientia) geht, laufen
die hier von Aristoteles erhobenen Vorwürfe ins Leere. (p. 796)
Among those who think that the mistake resides on the part of defend-
ers of division, there is a disagreement about who exactly is included in
that group. Alexander thinks that it is everyone in Plato’s circle, including
Plato.17 Striker (2009), on the other hand, lays the blame not on Plato but
other Platonists:
Aristotle’s harsh criticism of division in this chapter may be un-
derstandable if there were people in the Academy who thought
that the method of division was all that they needed in philoso-
phy, and who therefore paid no attention to Aristotle’s innova-
tions. (p. 209)
So Aristotle’s target was not Plato, but other proponents of the method of
division. The earliest such view seems to be that of Philoponus:
He wants to celebrate through these things the method he
handed down. For no one, he says, of those before us knew this,
but they all used the method of division and through it they
thought that they could demonstrate. And they say he is hint-
ing at Plato. And Plato apparently does celebrate the method
of division and most of all when it comes to be by contradic-
tion, since it is the most inescapable.18 However, he at least did
not say it was demonstrative. For clearly he knew the differ-
ence between the method of division and demonstration. For he
17Alex Aphr in APr 333,10 ff, in Top 1,14-19. Cherniss (1944) might also think that Plato
is confused because he says that Aristotle shows how division “transgresses the laws of
thought” (p. 28).
18Philoponus’ view about division by contradiction is more fully explained in the com-
mentary on the Categories (in Cat 29,19-30,24). There he argues that one should al-
ways divide into contradictory opposites (such as white/non-white) rather than contraries
(white/black), because the former, unlike the latter, are inescapable (ἄφυκτοι). He further
claims that division according to contradictories are knowledge-producing (in Ph 20,24-5).
The original source for this claim seems to be Sph 235c, which is paraphrased at in Cat
30,19-21.
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says that there are four methods of philosophizing which are in-
struments of dialectic: division, definition, demonstration, and
analysis. Perhaps then he is hinting at others who thought that
the method of division was demonstrative. (Phlp in APr 306,31-
307,9)19
Confusion can make sense of the existence of APr I.31, but is otherwise un-
motivated and quite uncharitable. There is little evidence that any defender
of division was confused. Plato lacked Aristotle’s technical language to
talk about deduction, so it is unclear what would even constitute evidence
one way or the other. While he does occasionally call a division a proof
(“ἀπόδειξις”), he does not use the expression in the same sense as Aristo-
tle.20 The same is true for other members of the Academy: there is no
fragment or report in which someone claims divisions are deductions of
a definition. There is a text that does seem to bear on the question. Sex-
tus Empiricus reports Xenocrates as supplementing a division with a proof
(ἀπόδειξις) of that division:
Xenocrates, however, somewhat unusually compared with the
others, and using the singular forms, said, “All that exists either
is good or is bad or neither is good nor bad.” And while the rest
of the philosophers accepted such a division without proof, he
thought it proper also to include a proof, as follows. If there
is anything which is distinct from good things and from bad
things and from things which are neither good nor bad, that
thing either is good or it is not good. And if it is good, it will
19Βούλεται διὰ τούτων ἐξυμνῆσ=αι τὴν παρ’ αὐτοῦ παραδεδομένην μέθοδον· οὐδεὶς γάρ, φησ=ί,
τῶν πρὸ ἡμῶν ταύτην ἠπίσ=τατο, ἀλλ’ ἐκέχρηντο πάντες τῇ διαιρετικῇ μεθόδῳ, καὶ διὰ ταύτης
ἐνόμιζον δύνασ=θαι ἀποδεικνύναι. αἰνίττεσ=θαι δέ φασ=ιν αὐτὸν εἰς Πλάτωνα. φαίνεται δὲ ὁ
Πλάτων ἐξυμνῶν μὲν τὴν διαιρετικὴν μέθοδον καὶ μάλισ=τα τὴν κατὰ ἀντίφασ=ιν γινομένην ὡς
ἀφυκτοτάτην οὖσ=αν, οὐ μέντοι γε ταύτην ἀποδεικτικὴν λέγει εἶναι. σ=αφῶς γὰρ οἶδε διαφορὰν
διαιρετικῆς καὶ ἀποδεικτικῆς· τέσ=σ=αρας γάρ φησ=ι μεθόδους εἶναι κατὰ φιλοσ=οφίαν ὄργανα τῆς
διαλεκτικῆς, διαιρετικήν, ὁρισ=τικήν, ἀποδεικτικὴν καὶ ἀναλυτικήν. ἴσ=ως οὖν εἴς τινας ἄλλους
αἰνίττεται τὴν διαιρετικὴν ἀποδεικτικὴν νομίζοντας.
20Shorey (1924); Striker (2009), p. 209. The only places in the vicinity of any discussion
of division where “ἀπόδειξις” comes up are in the Statesman (Plt 269c2, 273e5, 277a2, 277b6,
284b2). Here there is no hint of anything deductive being required, especially because what
is being demonstrated is the king or the statesman, not a proposition or fact. We do get a
contrast, however, between the “ἀπόδειξις” of the statesman and the “μύθος” about Kronos.
This suggests that, when dividing, the Visitor is not intending to tell a story, although the
story could contribute to the division/demonstration (273e5). Without going too deep into
this issue, it seems safe to say that the Visitor marks a non-narrative kind of exposition with
the term “ἀπόδειξις”.
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be one of the three; but if it is not good, either it is bad or it
neither is bad nor is good. But if it is bad, it will be one of the
three, while if it neither is good nor is bad, it will again be one
of the three. Thus everything that exists either is good or is bad
or neither is good nor bad. (SE M I.4-5, trans. Bett, 1997)21
This passage suggests that Xenocrates, at least, does not confuse the two in
the way that Aristotle suggests. He is attempting to demonstrate a propo-
sition of the form “Every G is S1 or...or Sn”, where G is a genus and S1...Sn
are its species (or at the very least, subclasses). But this is not the problem-
atic step for Aristotle, who rather thinks the problem is demonstrating that
the target kind is set under one of the S1-Sn.
Finally, it seems unlikely that Aristotle is only targeting some members
of the Academy because Aristotle is quite explicit that the error he is diag-
nosing in this chapter is common to everyone who used the method (APr
46a35), so it would be strange if he was not criticizing the first and most
prominent user of division: Plato.
Moreover, there is not much reason to think that Aristotle is confused
in the way that Ebert and Nortmann suggest. In the Posterior Analytics II.5,
a chapter that directly refers to our passage, Aristotle explicitly says that
there is “no absurdity” about division making clear a definition without
demonstrating or deducing, in exactly the same way that induction is clar-
ifying even though it is not deductive (APo 91b33-4). Later in the same
book, he calls division “useful” in the hunt for essence (APo 96b25-6).22
Thus this reading attributes not only confusion in Aristotle, but also incon-
sistency with his other discussions of division. We should therefore accept
Confusion only if all else fails.
Crubellier (2014), by contrast, argues that both division and Aristotle’s
method at I.27-29 are aimed at finding scientific propositions, a view which
I will call Discovery. Because they share this project, the comparison is
21ἰδιαίτερον δὲ παρὰ τοὺς ἄλλους ὁ Ξενοκράτης καὶ ταῖς ἑνικαῖς πτώσ=εσ=ι χρώμενος ἔφασ=κε·
“πᾶν τὸ ὂν ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν ἢ κακόν ἐσ=τιν ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν οὔτε κακόν ἐσ=τιν.” καὶ τῶν
λοιπῶν φιλοσ=όφων χωρὶς ἀποδείξεως τὴν τοιαύτην διαίρεσ=ιν προσ=ιεμένων αὐτὸς ἐδόκει καὶ
ἀπόδειξιν σ=υμπαραλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ ἔσ=τι τι κεχωρισ=μένον πρᾶγμα τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ
τῶν μήτε ἀγαθῶν μήτε κακῶν, ἐκεῖνο ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν ἢ οὐκ ἔσ=τιν ἀγαθόν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἀγαθόν
ἐσ=τιν, ἓν τῶν τριῶν γενήσ=εται· εἰ δ’ οὐκ ἔσ=τιν ἀγαθόν, ἤτοι κακόν ἐσ=τιν ἢ οὔτε κακόν ἐσ=τιν
οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν· εἰ δὲ κακόν ἐσ=τιν, ἓν τῶν τριῶν ὑπάρξει, εἰ δὲ οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν οὔτε
κακόν ἐσ=τι, πάλιν ἓν τῶν τριῶν κατασ=τήσ=εται. πᾶν ἄρα τὸ ὂν ἤτοι ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν ἢ κακόν ἐσ=τιν
ἢ οὔτε ἀγαθόν ἐσ=τιν οὔτε κακόν ἐσ=τιν.
22For thorough treatments of division in APo II.13, see Charles (2000), 221-239 and Bron-
stein (2016), 189-222.
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justified. Aristotle’s point is that his method is better than division because
it is far more general:
Aristote suggère que le projet de la diérèse est en un sens ap-
parenté à celui du Pont aux Ânes – si du moins « la méthode
que nous exposons ici » (46a32) vise spécifiquement le Pont
aux Ânes et non pas l’analytique dans son ensemble. Ce que
les deux projets ont en commun, c’est (1) la mise en ordre de
séries de termes reliés entre eux par des relations d’implication
notionnelle ; et (2) l’utilisation de ces séries pour produire des
propositions scientifiques, ou tout du moins (dans un contexte
dialectique) pour obtenir l’assentiment de l’interlocuteur. (p.
298, cf. p. 24)
This interpretation has a number of benefits. First, it makes sense of the
placement of the chapter directly after the chapters that describe Aristo-
tle’s method for finding syllogisms. Moreover, it gives Aristotle a reason-
able point to make that does not attribute any real confusion to any party
and fits well with Aristotle’s positive use of division in Posterior Analytics II.
Indeed, the notion of “ordering terms” and the use of the series “to produce
scientific propositions” are real and important commonalities between di-
vision and the method of I.27-29. Finally, the claim that the syllogistic is
more general, since it can be used for any kind of proposition, is clearly
true. In this way, it is a real improvement on Confusion. Discovery suf-
fers from the problem that it does not have much to do with Aristotle’s
arguments against division in this chapter, even though it is certainly right
that the “aforementioned method” referred to here is the one described in
I.27-30. Aristotle here argues that divisions are not syllogisms of their tar-
get claims—he does not argue against their ability to discover any kind of
proposition. We can see this by the chain of explanations that begins the
passage:
It is easy to see that division of genera is a small part of the
aforementioned method. For division is a kind of weak syllo-
gism. (APr 46a31-3)
Aristotle here claims that it is a small part of the aforementioned method
because it is a weak syllogism. But if Discovery is right, then this would
be a non-sequitur. What reason do we have for thinking that division is
an inferior way of discovering truths from the fact that it is an inferior kind
of syllogism? Aristotle never claims that his own way of finding syllogis-
tic premises, described in I.27-29, is itself syllogistic. We could only get a
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plausible line of thought here if we assume that the syllogistic was the only
way to discover new propositions. But Aristotle never commits himself to this
and his claims about induction as a non-syllogistic way of learning (APo
71a5-6). Indeed, Crubellier’s account of why division is a weak syllogism
shows this:
Il est possible de décrire la diérèse comme un sullogismos parce
que, tout comme l’inférence syllogistique s’achève par la réca-
pitulation des prémisses et la production de la conclusion, la
diérèse produit la définition recherchée par la récapitulation de
ses étapes et que, comme dans la déduction, le répondant n’est
pas libre de la refuser. Mais c’est une déduction « sans force
» parce que son application se limite aux questions définition-
nelles et parce que, même dans ce champ limité, elle ne produit
pas réellement de connaissance nouvelle: si l’interrogateur peut
conclure, par exemple, que l’homme est un animal mortel, c’est
parce que le répondant lui aura déjà accordé que « l’homme est
un animal » et que « l’homme est mortel ». (p. 298)
In this passage, Crubellier tries to reconcile the obvious fact that Aristotle
is claiming division is a syllogism with Discovery. But his account of why it
is “weak” or “sans force” because it is limited to definitional questions and
commits a petitio principii does not fit Aristotle’s own explanation:
For division is a kind of weak syllogism. For, 1) it asks for what
it ought to show and 2) it deduces something higher up. (APr
46a32-4)
This explanation of the weakness of division only has to do with the fact
that it does not deduce what it claims to deduce, not because it is limited
to definitional questions, which is presented by Aristotle as quite distinct
criticisms later in the chapter (46b26-8). Thus, while Discovery does point
to important commonalities, the line of argument that Aristotle adduces
in 46a31-34 does not make reference to division’s limited ability to find
anything but only its lack of syllogistic power. The commonality, there-
fore, plays no explicit role in Aristotle’s argumentation. While this is not
sufficient for rejecting Discovery outright, if another interpretation can be
found that clearly elaborates Aristotle’s argument without attributing con-
fusion to anyone, that would be preferable.
Finally, according to Smith (1989), the real issue has to do with obtaining
Knowledge:
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Aristotle is sometimes criticized for treating this procedure as a
rival in some way to his theory of deductions: after all, it may be
urged, the two have quite different objectives, and therefore it
is no more a valid criticism of division that it fails to prove than
it would be to object that deductions or demonstrations fail to
define. But there is a deeper point. Aristotle’s real complaint
is that division is not a method which leads to the acquisition
of knowledge: at each step, the divider must ‘ask for the initial
thing.’ Thus, the method cannot produce understanding. (p.
160)
Knowledge is, very broadly speaking, on the right track. The two methods
seem to play important roles in Plato’s and Aristotle’s respective concep-
tions of scientific knowledge, so it would be no surprise if the different
views about division resulted from different conceptions of science. But
this on its own is too vague to justify Aristotle in making the comparison,
since after all, they could play quite different roles in the acquisition of
knowledge. According to Knowledge, the gap is filled by the requirement
that knowledge cannot be acquired from question-begging arguments. The
reason why, it seems, is that division doesn’t give the inquirer anything be-
yond what she started with.
This diagnosis, however, is still in tension with Aristotle’s positive
claim that division can produce knowledge:
But it [division] is still not a syllogism, even if it produces
knowledge in another way. And this is not absurd, since some-
one performing an induction does not demonstrate, but never-
theless makes something clear. (APo 91b32-35)23
The basic point here is that there are many non-deductive and non-
demonstrative ways of making things clear. Induction clearly extends our
knowledge in this way. And here in APo II.5, which directly refers to APr
I.31 (91b12-15), Aristotle clearly still thinks that division begs the question,
but says that it is not absurd that it produces knowledge.24 If Aristotle
23ἀλλὰ σ=υλλογισ=μὸς ὅμως οὐκ ἔσ=τι, ἀλλ’ εἴπερ, ἄλλον τρόπον γνωρίζειν ποιεῖ. καὶ τοῦτο μὲν
οὐδὲν ἄτοπον· οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ ἐπάγων ἴσ=ως ἀποδείκνυσ=ιν, ἀλλ’ ὅμως δηλοῖ τι.
24In this passage, Aristotle doesn’t say how division will produce knowledge, but in APo
II.13, he claims that this will happen by producing an ordering of the predicates in the def-
inition (96b30-35). Bronstein (2016), pp. 211-219 argues that division can also help discover
at least some of the differentiae. However, when Aristotle considers the objection that divi-
sion just “assumes everything [in the definition, i.e., genus and differentiae] straightaway”
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thought division could not give us new facts, which were previously un-
known, this would also be problematic for his own view of demonstration,
since he claims that one will often first obtain the facts and then later seek
their explanations (APr I.30, APo II.1). In such cases, the conclusion of the
demonstration was something already known. What was not known was
its cause. Thus, if the requirement is that division produces knowledge of
new facts, that would seem to be just as problematic for what Aristotle has
to say about demonstration as it is for division.
This point could be finessed by saying that the sort of knowledge pro-
duced by division is a different sort of knowledge (γνῶσ0ις) than that pro-
vided sometimes by syllogistic (ἀποδεικτικὴ ἐπισ0τήμη). Perhaps Aristotle’s
point is that what syllogisms, at least when they are demonstrative, get
you is more intellectually rewarding than what division gets you. The sci-
entific understanding that comes with possessing a demonstration is just
a much more significant achievement than the knowledge one has from
division. This would be adequate if there were demonstrative knowledge
of the thing that division aims at: definitions. For then we could see how
the syllogistic does something that division does not. But Aristotle denies
that there are demonstrations of these kinds of definitions. Knowledge, in
the end, seems to undermine Aristotle’s justification for comparing the two
methods, since division and syllogistic are, after all, aimed at acquiring dif-
ferent things. Division will be aimed at getting γνῶσ0ις of essences through
definitions, while demonstrative syllogisms will aim at getting scientific
understanding of other propositions.25 So, while Knowledge was right to
look at the respective conceptions of science, it still failed to justify the com-
parison.
In what follows, I will reconsider the Platonic texts concerning divi-
sion and use them to provide a new interpretation of Aristotle’s compari-
son. This interpretation will make sense of both Aristotle’s critical remarks
about division in APr I.31 (unlike Discovery) and be consistent with his
positive remarks about division as a method (unlike Knowledge and Con-
fusion). First, I will make clear how both methods are intended to be rig-
(96b28-9), he does not deny it, but claims that what division does do is give the proper or-
der. If he didn’t think that one needed to assume all of the elements in the definition at the
outset, he presumably would have said so there. Moreover, if one didn’t have all the differ-
entiae at the outset, one could not perform division in the way advised, since this requires
the inquirer to select at each stage the differentia which contains all the others (96b35-97a6).
If there were some differentiae missing, this procedure could not be performed.
25For my purposes, it does not matter whether non-demonstrative knowledge in the
sense of APo I.3 is the same as νοῦς, as in Bronstein (2016). I only suppose that there is
some kind of γνῶσ=ις of essence which is non-demonstrative.
16
orous and general ways of obtaining scientific knowledge concerning the
part-whole relations among kinds. Contextualizing this chapter in this way
justifies Aristotle’s criticism by showing how they have relevantly similar
features that could form the basis of a meaningful comparison. Then I will
argue that Aristotle’s point in comparing the methods is to show the im-
portance of valid arguments in this scientific enterprise. Instead of replacing
division with syllogistic, Aristotle is showing that syllogistic is a necessary
part of a scientist’s repertoire that is not already covered by division.
In short, Aristotle thinks of division as a means of obtaining defini-
tions, which are the starting points of demonstrations, or scientific syllo-
gisms. In order for division to play this role, it is important to see how
it is not a demonstration, since the starting points of demonstration are
indemonstrable. What will emerge is a considerable continuity in the Pla-
tonic/Aristotelian projects. Division is not playing a sort of second fiddle
to demonstration. Instead, the methods are compared because doing so
will shed light on how they both contribute to a common Platonic and Aris-
totelian conception of what scientific understanding is and how to achieve
it. This is a common way for Aristotle to deal with his predecessors: he
puts their views into his framework in order to show where they go wrong
or miss something. While such a procedure might sometimes lead to dis-
tortion of their views, in this case at least, I will argue that all of Aristotle’s
critical points can be appreciated even if division is not thought to be de-
ductive.
In §2, I show that both methods have the properties of epistemic gener-
ality and rigor. I argue in §3 that the methods both investigate predications
conceptualized in terms of part and whole, thus suggesting that the con-
trast drawn in §1.3 betwen identity claims and quantificational claims is
nto as stark as it initially seemed.26
26Previous scholars, arguing for division’s influence on the syllogistic, have vaguely ges-
tured at each of these. See Maier (1896) (esp. II.2, pp. 56-85) on the first, Lutoslawski (1897),
p. 464 on the second, and Solmsen (1929; 1941) on the third. It was the dominant position
in the 19th and early 20th centuries that Platonic division influenced Aristotle’s logic (see
also Prantl (1853), p. 203; Jowett (1892), p. 192; Ross (1923), p. 32, although he would later
change his position; de Strycker (1932a; 1932b); Bochenski (1951); Pellegrin (1981); Mignucci
(2000)). Kneale and Kneale (1962) have some affinities with Solmsen. For criticism of the in-
fluence claim, see Shorey (1924; 1933); Ross (1939; 1949); Cherniss (1944); Kapp (1942; 1975);
Moravscik (2004).
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2 Division and syllogistic as scientific methods
2.1 Epistemic Generality
Both Platonic division and Aristotelian syllogistic were intended to have a
certain kind of generality that has historically been associated with logic.
The sort of generality that I have in mind is that the theory is meant to
apply to any sort of science one might engage in, whatever the subject mat-
ter.27 Moreover, division and syllogistic are supposed to be general ways
of coming to know about any subject matter whatsoever through reason-
ing, or “giving accounts”. This property might seem to be too abstract and
vague to count as an important similarity. But it is not. There are many
scientific methodologies which have no such aspirations. Methods of med-
ical inference from symptom to underlying cause, as was common in the
Greek “rationalist” tradition, have no place in geometry. Nor does geomet-
rical analysis have any obvious place in medicine. That is to say, neither of
these methodologies aspire to be general, since there are scientific domains
in which they are not applicable.28 If Platonic division and Aristotelian syl-
logistic are (intended to be) general in this sense, that would be a striking
point of similarity.
Plato claimed the method of division had this very special kind of gen-
erality. For instance, in the Philebus, when Socrates introduces the method
of division (albeit with some unusual language, calling kinds “ones” that
are discovered along the way from the genus and calling a division com-
plete when the inquirer “knows how many the original one is”), he makes
a strong statement about how widely his method is meant to apply:
Since these things are organized in this way, with regard to ev-
erything we must always look for a single form after positing it
in each case—for we will find it because it is there. And once
we have grasped it, we must look for two, as the case would
have it, or if not, for three or some other number. And we must
treat every one of those further unities in the same way, until it
is not only established of the original unit that it is one, many
27See, for example, MacFarlane (2002) for a defense of the centrality of this aspect of logic
in Kant and Frege.
28This is not to say that there is no place for geometry in medicine, which even Aristotle
accepted: “It is characteristic of the doctor to know that circular wounds heal more slowly,
but it is characteristic of the geometer to know why” (APo 79a14-16). Nevertheless, while
this shows that geometric results are important in medicine, Aristotle is emphatically not
suggesting that doctors need to learn all the relevant geometric methods to prove this.
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and unlimited, but also how many kinds it is. [...] The gods, as
I have said, have left us this legacy of how to inquire and learn and
teach one another. (Phlb 16c-e, emphases mine)29
So far, we just have heard that this method is a divine way to inquire, learn,
and teach. But soon after this, Socrates strengthens the claim:
So at the same time they [the first music theorists] made us re-
alize that one should investigate about every one and many in
this way. For whenever you have mastered these things in this
way, then you have acquired expertise there, and whenever you
have grasped the unity of any of the other things there are, you
have become wise about that. (Phlb 17d-e)30
This passage suggests that the method of division is a way to inquire (or
learn or teach) in any domain and that success in the method means that
you have acquired wisdom. Those who ignore it, on the other hand, are
said to be eristics simply grouping things “in a chance way” (Phlb 16e). The
same is said in the Phaedrus, where division is the ability in any instruc-
tion “to cut up any kind according to its species along its natural joints”
(Phdr 265e). In the Sophist, dialectic is defined by the Eleatic stranger as the
quite general skill of being able to “divide things by kinds and not to think
that the same form is a different one or that a different form is the same”
(Sph 253d1-2) and, in the Statesman, he claims to be teaching Theaetetus
and Young Socrates about division in order to make them “better dialec-
ticians in relation to all subjects” (Plt 285d5-6). We see just how serious
Plato is about generality in his uncontroversial applications of the method
to domains as diverse as music theory, political philosophy, and phonol-
ogy.31 The enormous range of application further motivates the thought
that Plato took division to be perfectly general, in the sense that it applies
to every subject matter.
Aristotle considers his syllogistic to have a similar scope. Recall that in
the introduction of the method in APr I.30, he claims:
29δεῖν οὖν ἡμᾶς τούτων οὕτω διακεκοσ=μημένων ἀεὶ μίαν ἰδέαν περὶ παντὸς ἑκάσ=τοτε θεμέ-
νους ζητεῖν – εὑρήσ=ειν γὰρ ἐνοῦσ=αν – ἐὰν οὖν μεταλάβωμεν, μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσ=ί, σ=κοπεῖν,
εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν, καὶ τῶν ἓν ἐκείνων ἕκασ=τον πάλιν ὡσ=αύτως, μέχριπερ ἂν
τὸ κατ’ ἀρχὰς ἓν μὴ ὅτι ἓν καὶ πολλὰ καὶ ἄπειρά ἐσ=τι μόνον ἴδῃ τις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὁπόσ=α· [...] οἱ μὲν
οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσ=αν σ=κοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσ=κειν ἀλλήλους·
30καὶ ἅμα ἐννοεῖν ὡς οὕτω δεῖ περὶ παντὸς ἑνὸς καὶ πολλῶν σ=κοπεῖν – ὅταν γὰρ αὐτά τε λάβῃς
οὕτω, τότε ἐγένου σ=οφός, ὅταν τε ἄλλο τῶν ἓν ὁτιοῦν ταύτῃ σ=κοπούμενος ἕλῃς, οὕτως ἔμφρων
περὶ τοῦτο γέγονας·
31See Lukas (1888) for more or less explicit examples in nine dialogues.
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The method is one and the same for all things, both concerning
philosophy as well as any skill or learning whatever. (46a3-4)
Aristotle claims that his syllogistic method works in the same way for all
things. An argument will be a syllogism regardless of the epistemic sta-
tus or subject matter of the premises and conclusion, and our method of
looking for syllogisms and deducing validly will also be the same. Here
we see a close analogy with what Plato claims for division. The similar-
ity is clear when we look at how closely the passage above is paralleled
by the end of I.31: “this way of investigation [division] is neither suitable
for every inquiry, nor even useful in those very cases in which it appears
to be most appropriate.” It seems that Aristotle denies for division almost
exactly what he affirmed about syllogistic.
While Aristotle does not think that every syllogism produces knowl-
edge, a special kind of syllogism, demonstration, will. A syllogism requires
special kinds of premises in order to be demonstrative: true, primary, im-
mediate, better known than the conclusion, prior to the conclusion, and
explanatory of the conclusion (APo I.2). Coming to know, then, requires
the scientist to do two things: to have at hand premises of this sort and
to construct syllogisms of the propositions to be demonstrated from those
premises. The syllogistic is one of the crucial elements in Aristotle’s the-
ory of science as described in the Posterior Analytics. The theory of science
there is completely general and meant to apply to any scientific or technical
domain whatsoever. Thus the syllogistic too must be general.
We have found that the project of division and syllogistic are, despite
appearances, very close in this respect. Both are meant to play a central role
in every scientific enterprise.
2.2 Rigor
Plato and Aristotle wanted these procedures to be not only general but also
rigorous. While generality regards what subject matters the procedure can
be applied to, rigor is a matter of how that procedure is applied. There
is no agreed upon analysis of rigor available.32 However, I will assume
here that a procedure is rigorous just in case it minimizes error in pursuit
of its goal: applications of the method should result in errors as little as
32The current literature on rigor has focused on the case of mathematics e.g., in Burgess
(2015); Paseau (2016). For the history of rigor in analytic philosophy, see Floyd (2013), who
resists a univocal notion of “rigor”, but does suggest its deep connections to notions of “the
elimination or reduction of guesswork, ad hocness, haphazardness, and potential error” (p.
1011).
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possible. For some types of problem there might be infallible methods,
but in most situations there will inevitably be residual error. A method, for
the purposes of this discussion, is a procedure that outputs an answer to
a certain kind of question and (possibly) some fixed set of parameters. An
application of a particular method requires specifying a particular question
and the parameters (for instance, with statistical methods one must sup-
ply both the hypothesis under investigation as well as parameters such as
data points and the p-value). An application of a method results in an error
when the answer returned by the method is false. So a method is rigor-
ous if it minimizes the proportion of false answers to the input questions
with parameters. Thus, while a non-rigorous method might give a correct
answer sometimes, it does not reliably give correct answers.
Before going on to Plato and Aristotle, let me give a few examples to
illustrate rigorous and non-rigorous methods. Something like “Believe the
truth” isn’t a method, since it does not actually output any answer to a
question. A very non-rigorous method is something like “Believe only what
is in your horoscope”. The sieve of Eratosthenes, an algorithm for finding
prime numbers, is rigorous in this sense: following it guarantees that you
get the right answer. While algorithms (in the technical sense used in com-
puter science) are an important class of rigorous procedures, rigor is not
only manifested in algorithms. The user of a rigorous but non-algorithmic
method may need some ingenuity, but that ingenuity is either sufficiently
constrained by the method or there are parts of the method that prevent
errors, perhaps because there is an algorithm for checking the answer that
one has.33 The ancient method of geometrical analysis, for instance, does
not work without input from the inquirer, but is rigorous in that the tech-
nique does not lead to errors. Stephen Menn puts this quite clearly:
The method of analysis had enormous prestige, in antiquity
and down to the days of Descartes and Fermat, because it was
seen as the basic method of mathematical discovery: not sim-
ply a way for a student to discover and assimilate for himself
propositions already known to his teachers, but also a way for
a mature geometer to discover previously unknown proposi-
tions. While analysis is a method with clear rules for step-by-
step work (though it is not a mechanical method—the geometer
must apply the rules intelligently in order to succeed), it termi-
nates when something unpredictably "clicks"; then, if and when
33Even non-deterministic algorithms do not require ingenuity. Rather, they make use of
a random variable either to get an answer with certainty or with high probability.
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this happens, the geometer must again proceed methodically
(again, not mechanically) by the method of synthesis, to confirm
what has been discovered by analysis; if this succeeds, then the
newly discovered proposition may be presented with a demon-
stration in the usual highly stylized form given in the classic
Greek mathematical texts. (Menn, 2002, pp. 194-5)
What Menn is suggesting by calling analysis “step-by-step” but
“not...mechanical” is exactly what I am intending by a rigorous but non-
algorithmic method. The problem here is that sometimes the “steps” are
not sufficiently precise that they can be run by a computer. But that
does not mean that the steps don’t work to reduce human error when
applied with intelligence. Nevertheless, algorithms have a distinct ad-
vantage over rigorous, non-algorithmic, methods like geometrical analy-
sis: they always terminate. Deterministic algorithms (and a special class of
non-deterministic algorithms) have the further advantage that they always
terminate with the correct answer. A non-rigorous method, by contrast, can
attain its goal, but not in virtue of the method alone—it also requires luck
or the inquirer’s knack.
According to Plato, divisions should be done rigorously. In the Philebus,
he gestures at the need for rigor by pointing out defective divisions:
The gods, as I have said, have left us this legacy of how to in-
quire and learn and teach one another. But these days the wise
guys make a one in a chance way and a many faster and slower
than they ought. After the one they go directly to the unlimited
and the intermediates escape them, which are what determines
whether our speaking with each other is dialectical or eristic.
(Phlb 16e-17a)34
According to Socrates, dividing incorrectly results in an eristical account,
while his preferred method leads to a dialectical account. The difference
between the dialectical and eristical accounts is not that the former must be
true and the latter false. Rather, Socrates objects to the way that the eristic
gets her account: by collecting in a chance way or dividing too quickly or
slowly. I will argue below that the problem here is precisely one of rigor:
34οἱ μὲν οὖν θεοί, ὅπερ εἶπον, οὕτως ἡμῖν παρέδοσ=αν σ=κοπεῖν καὶ μανθάνειν καὶ διδάσ=κειν
ἀλλήλους· οἱ δὲ νῦν τῶν ἀνθρώπων σ=οφοὶ ἓν μέν, ὅπως ἂν τύχωσ=ι, καὶ πολλὰ θᾶττον καὶ
βραδύτερον ποιοῦσ=ι τοῦ δέοντος, μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἓν ἄπειρα εὐθύς, τὰ δὲ μέσ=α αὐτοὺς ἐκφεύγει
– οἷς διακεχώρισ=ται τό τε διαλεκτικῶς πάλιν καὶ τὸ ἐρισ=τικῶς ἡμᾶς ποιεῖσ=θαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους
τοὺς λόγους.
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it is not about getting the correct answer on a given occasion, but using a
method that minimizes the possibility of error generally.
In the Statesman, we get some explicit reasoning why going too fast
is problematic when Young Socrates divides herd-rearing too quickly into
rearing of human herds and beast herds. This is exactly the same kind of
mistake mentioned in the Philebus passage. The Eleatic Visitor explains the
problem:
Visitor: Ah, yes. You’ve made a very zealous and courageous
division! However, we should try not to have this happen ever
again! ... For it is most fine to separate off the object of inquiry
from the others straightaway, should you do it correctly, just as
a moment ago, when you thought that you had the division,
you rushed the account, seeing that it was headed towards hu-
mans. But my friend, it is not safe to do such fine work. Instead,
cutting through the intermediate stages is safer and one would
more encounter ideas. This makes all the difference in investi-
gations. (Plt 262a-b)35
We could formalize such a norm that the Visitor mentions in the following
way. Assume that we start from kind K and are aiming to define a target














one should prefer the former to the latter if n>m. That is, one should prefer
a division with more “intermediates”. As defined here, this norm is non-
trivial and gives significant advice to the one dividing. While it certainly
35ΞΕ. Παντάπασ=ί γε προθυμότατα καὶ ἀνδρειότατα διῄρησ=αι· μὴ μέντοι τοῦτό γε εἰς αὖθις
κατὰ δύναμιν πάσ=χωμεν. ...κάλλισ=τον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων εὐθὺς διαχωρίζειν τὸ ζητού-
μενον, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἔχῃ, καθάπερ ὀλίγον σ=ὺ πρότερον οἰηθεὶς ἔχειν τὴν διαίρεσ=ιν ἐπέσ=πευσ=ας τὸν
λόγον, ἰδὼν ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπους πορευόμενον· ἀλλὰ γάρ, ὦ φίλε, λεπτουργεῖν οὐκ ἀσ=φαλές, διὰ
μέσ=ων δὲ ἀσ=φαλέσ=τερον ἰέναι τέμνοντας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἰδέαις ἄν τις προσ=τυγχάνοι. τοῦτο δὲ
διαφέρει τὸ πᾶν πρὸς τὰς ζητήσ=εις.
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does not amount to anything like an algorithm, it does provide concrete ac-
tionable steps for an inquirer to take. If an inquirer makes several attempts
at a division, for example, she could look at them all and reject those that
have fewer or no intermediates. Indeed, this norm my seem to be too strong
to be plausible. As will be seen below, however, the Visitor does have an
argument for accepting it.
To illustrate the mistake, the Visitor gives two other divisions that reach
the same end point but do so more quickly (266c9-11) and more slowly
(265b8-e2). In introducing them, he claims that the faster route will resem-
ble the problematic division of Young Socrates:
Now it seems that there are two routes to be seen stretching out
in the direction of the part towards which our argument has
hurried, one of them quicker, dividing a small part off against
a large one, while the other more closely observes the principle
we were talking about earlier, that one should cut in the middle
as much as possible, but is longer. (Plt 265a1-5)36
Since the slower, longer route satisfies the rule of not chopping off little
bits while the other does not, it seems that the faster one is problematic.
This suggests we should prefer that longer route because it is “safer.”37 The
safety of the Visitor’s method is meant to guard against a particular sort of
error that the fast method could not: missing ideas, the explanatory natural
kinds that should be in one’s definitions. This constitutes evidence that
Plato is arguing that slow division is more rigorous than fast division in the
sense that it minimizes error. Indeed, it seems that the notion of “safety” in
these passages should be understood precisely as rigor in the sense defined
above.
Plato not only wants a rigorous method of division, he also proposes
two norms to promote it: 1) divide slowly and 2) divide into the smallest
number of subkinds possible (Plt 287b-c, Phlb 16d). We saw his statement of
the first norm above. The second is made explicit later on in the dialogue:
Visitor: So do you recognize that it is difficult to cut them into
36Καὶ μὴν ἐφ’ ὅ γε μέρος ὥρμηκεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος, ἐπ’ ἐκεῖνο δύο τινὲ καθορᾶν ὁδὼ τεταμένα
φαίνεται, τὴν μὲν θάττω, πρὸς μέγα μέρος σ=μικρὸν διαιρουμένην, τὴν δέ, ὅπερ ἐν τῷ πρόσ=θεν
ἐλέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ μεσ=οτομεῖν ὡς μάλισ=τα, τοῦτ’ ἔχουσ=αν μᾶλλον, μακροτέραν γε μήν.
37Some, such as Gill (2012), think that the long route is too long. If that were so, we
would have expected the Visitor to have corrected himself, since that is what he tends to
do in this dialogue. He nowhere repudiates it, even though he makes other adjustments to
this stretch of the division later on. Note also the parallel to “safer” causal explanations in
Phaedo 100d. These explanations are safe precisely because they do not lead to errors.
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two? The cause, I think, will become more evident if we pro-
ceed....Then let’s divide them limb by limb, like a sacrificial an-
imal, since we can’t do it into two. For we must always cut into
the nearest number so far as we can. (Plt 287b10-c5)38
The last sentence of this passage makes clear another norm, which is that
one should minimize the number of proximate subkinds that one divides
into. Although he does not think that all good divisions need to be dichoto-
mous, he stills holds on to a weaker norm that, if one is presented with two
















the former should be preferred to the later if n<m. This too is paralleled in
the Philebus, where Socrates says “after the one, one ought to seek two, if
that’s now many there are, or else three or some other number” (Phlb 16d3-
4).39 Here we seem to get the advice to first look for two subkinds, then
three, and so on. Such a procedure would be equivalent to looking always
for the smallest number of dividentia.
Moreover, in the first case, he explicitly defends the norm by arguing
that it minimizes the possibility of error (Plt 261e-264b). He shows this by
arguing that, if one does not follow the norm, there is a possibility of error
that would have been excluded by following the norm. This is made clear
in the examples he uses following Young Socrates’ division. Young Socrates
was not rigorous in his division of animals into humans and beasts because
it was possible, using the same kind of reasoning, to divide humans into
Greeks and Barbarians or numbers into 10,000 and not-10,000 (Plt 262c-e).
Such divisions, the Visitor claims, obviously would have been erroneous,
since they would have missed fundamental kinds along the way—in the
case of numbers, odd and even and in the case of humans, male and fe-
male.40 While he does not claim that Young Socrates himself missed a fun-
38{ΞΕ.} Οἶσ=θ’ οὖν ὅτι χαλεπὸν αὐτὰς τεμεῖν δίχα; τὸ δ’ αἴτιον, ὡς οἶμαι, προϊοῦσ=ιν οὐχ ἧττον
ἔσ=ται καταφανές. ...Κατὰ μέλη τοίνυν αὐτὰς οἷον ἱερεῖον διαιρώμεθα, ἐπειδὴ δίχα ἀδυνατοῦμεν.
δεῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸν ἐγγύτατα ὅτι μάλισ=τα τέμνειν ἀριθμὸν ἀεί.
39μετὰ μίαν δύο, εἴ πως εἰσ=ί, σ=κοπεῖν, εἰ δὲ μή, τρεῖς ἤ τινα ἄλλον ἀριθμόν.
40It is a common assumption in the literature that the problem noted in this passage has
to do with Young Socrates dividing into “negative kinds”. See, for example, Frede (1967),
pp. 93-4 Moravscik (1973); Cohen (1973); Wedin (1987); Fine (1993), p. 111; Berman (1996);
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damental kind in his division, he objected to the way he was dividing be-
cause it could lead to errors. Here the Visitor is showing concern not just
for the truth, but at arriving at the truth “safely”. He claims that dividing
slowly, by which he means dividing with many intermediate steps, reduces
the possibility of this kind of error. That is because there could be a kind
more general than the kind that you divided into that was passed over in
the fast division and this will not be part of the account, as you will already
be dealing with smaller classes. Thus you will not meet your goal of having
a complete account of the essence. Applying these norms helps make di-
vision rigorous by preventing some important kinds of errors, even if they
are not sufficient for eliminating every possible kind of error.41
One might worry that dividing too quickly does not just risk an error,
but is itself an error. Here we should distinguish between the idea that there
is an error in the output from the idea that there is an error or mistake in
the method. I am claiming that Young Socrates does make a mistake in the
method that does not, in this one case, lead to a mistake in the output. So
much seems to be demanded by the very language of safety, which does
not by itself imply that there was an error in the resulting definition, but
only greater possibility of such an error. But how is it that Young Socrates
didn’t make a mistake in the output if he skipped over a kind? He did not
make an error in the output because the long conjunction of descriptions
“two-footed, non-interbreeding, hornless, terrestrial, tame animal” is just
a further spelling out of “human”. Thus, when Young Socrates said that
Gill (2012), p. 182; Ambuel (2013). Dissenters to this assumption include Lane (1998), p.
76 and Crivelli (2012), p. 212, who makes the crucial point that “[i]n the Statesman Plato
is not concerned with the existence of kinds matching negative predicables, but with the
correctness of divisions.” Further evidence for this point comes from the fact that, when
the Visitor goes on to illustrate divisions that are not problematic in the way that Socrates’
was, he uses negative kinds: hornless, non-interbreeding. This would be very strange if
the problem was the use of negative kinds. Gill suggests that the problem is only using
a negative kind at the last stage of the division, but there is no textual evidence for this.
Indeed, nothing corresponding to “negative” can be found in the passage at all. While
there is a concern in this passage for the distinction between parts and kinds, there is no
suggestion that sometimes a negation always results in a mere part.
41For the norm of dividing into the smallest number of subkinds, there is no explicit justi-
fication. We could imagine one very close to the one he game for the other norm, however.
Suppose that you violate Minimization. Then there could be a kind which belongs to the
essence of the target kind and is the genus of several of the kinds divided into. However,
this will not be included, as you divided directly into its subkinds. Thus you will not meet
your goal of having a complete account. Aristotle gives a different justification for the same
norm in Top 109b13-29. In this passage, he argues that arguments based on such divisions
proceed more quickly, since they deal with a small number of large groups instead of a large
number of small groups.
26
statecraft was a kind of herding of humans, he was not saying anything in-
consistent with the Visitor’s definition. Nothing essential was missed in the
account because Young Socrates got lucky when using the term “human”,
which builds in the long description given by the Visitor. In the case of the
number 10,000, by contrast, one would have missed the essential property
of evenness.
Rigor is manifested in Aristotle’s syllogistic at two points in the method.
Recall that the goal of his method is to produce a syllogism of a desired
conclusion. As was mentioned above, the first stage of the method (discov-
ering the syllogism) is algorithmic. If a set of premises contains a syllogism,
Aristotle’s procedure is guaranteed to find it and following the procedure
will never lead to one giving an argument that is not a syllogism. This
method is completely rigorous. Not only is the method for finding syllo-
gisms rigorous, so too is the syllogism itself.42 Valid argumentation is plau-
sibly more reliable than invalid argumentation, simply because, whereas
the only way for a valid argument not to result in a true conclusion is if
one of the premises is false, invalid argumentation may not result in a true
conclusion both when one of the premises is false and when they are true.
These two points together make the entire procedure described in APr I.31
rigorous, since that method consists in both the search for syllogisms and
giving those syllogisms.
In both cases, we are demanding of the methods that they minimize
the possibility of error. However, while there is residual error in Plato’s
method, Aristotle’s has two advantages: his method always terminates and
does so with the correct answer, so long as the inputs were themselves cor-
rect.43 Because they are different methods it will turn out that rigor is man-
ifested differently in each case, but they have a similar spirit. Moreover,
very few methods are both rigorous and general. Most rigorous scientific
methods of which we are familiar have a very limited domain of applica-
bility, and likewise very general methods have, on the whole, a large room
for error. For instance, the so-called “Socratic elenchus” can be used on any
question whatsoever, but has a wide margin of error, if one seeks positive
results with it.
42According to Malink (2015), this kind of rigor is one of the distinguishing marks of the
treatment of syllogisms in the Analytics as opposed to the Topics.
43The method specified in APr I.27-30 does not give an algorithm for generating the lists
of predications, so there may be some residual error in syllogizing the target conclusion if
and only if there is no completely rigorous way of generating those lists.
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3 Investigating Mereological Relations
Finally, the two methods are parts of a common project not only in how
they investigate, but also in what they investigate: mereological relations
between kinds.
To see this in Plato’s case, it will be helpful to start with an example:
Skill, a general kind, divided into Production and Acquisition. The relation
between Skill and, e.g., Production is one of whole to part. This is suggested
by the language of division itself: as a part is standardly defined as that
into which a whole is divided. Plato also has the Eleatic Visitor state the
claim dogmatically:
That whenever there is a species of something, it is necessarily
also a part of whatever thing it is said to be a species of, but it
is not at all necessary that a part is a species. You must always
assert, Socrates, that this is what I say rather than the other way
around. (Plt 263b7-10)44
Here the Visitor says that A being a species of B implies that A is a part
of B, but not vice versa. Since division here and more generally in Plato
is into kinds, this passage shows quite clearly that Plato thinks of the re-
lationship between kinds in mereological terms. So, although definitions,
the ultimate goals of division, may be identities, the method of division
approaches definitions by first discovering mereological relations between
kinds.45
Mereology comes into Aristotle’s method through his account of pred-
ication. The method, as he develops it, relies on a distinction between four
kinds of definite propositions:
• Universal Affirmative: b belongs to (or is predicated of) every a.
(Equivalent to saying “Every a is b”)
• Universal Negative: b belongs to no a. (“No a is b”)
44῾Ως εἶδος μὲν ὅταν ᾖ του, καὶ μέρος αὐτὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ πράγματος ὅτουπερ ἂν εἶδος
λέγηται· μέρος δὲ εἶδος οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη. ταύτῃ με ἢ ’κείνῃ μᾶλλον, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀεὶ φάθι
λέγειν.
45The notion of structured wholes on which this account relies may be distinctive of late
Platonic metaphysics. Some have argued that there is a transition in Plato’s thinking about
forms, beginning with the idea that they are simple and partless (e.g., in the Phaedo and
Republic) and moving towards a view on which they have mereological structure after the
Parmenides. See, e.g., Rickless (2007), pp. 240-250. Since I am only looking at the relationship
between the late dialogues and Aristotle, I can stay neutral about the question of Platonic
development on this issue. For more on structured wholes, see Harte (2002).
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• Particular Affirmative: b belongs to some a. (“Some a is b”)
• Particular Negative: b does not belong to some a. (“Not every a is b”)
The rules in Aristotle’s method for deducing conclusions and finding
premises for deduction are entirely determined by which of these cate-
gories the propositions fit into. This distinction is therefore crucial to his
method. I will argue that the four types of proposition used in the syllogis-
tic are defined by Aristotle in terms of a mereological predication relation.
It is widely agreed that in the dictum de omni et nullo syllogistic propositions
are defined in terms of predication. It is disputed whether they are defined
in terms of a notion of predication different from universal affirmative.46
While I will stay neutral with respect to the dispute between these two
readings, the former reading is usually associated with a view of predica-
tion akin to Frege’s, which takes predication to be a relation between two
different syntactic types.47 It might be objected that the mereological inter-
pretation only fits with the heterodox interpretation. While it is true that
the heterodox interpreters generally place more emphasis on mereology, it
seems to me that the orthodox interpreter can perfectly well accommodate
the mereological language by simply pointing out that the subset relation
satisfies all of the axioms of standard mereological theories. Thus “All a is
b” would express a part/whole relation between a and b because the exten-
sion of a is a subset of the extension of b.48 The mereological claim is quite
plausible in cases where the terms refer to substances. However, Aristotle
believes predications like “All swans are white” are true, but is it right to
say they express a mereological relation?
Three reasons for a positive answer have been suggested in the liter-
ature. 1) Aristotle’s terminology for predication is steeped in mereologi-
cal language.49 He marks his phrase for universal predication (“belongs
46See Corcoran (1972, 1973); Ebert (1995); Barnes (2007), for the view that they are dif-
ferent, but Morison (2008, 2015); Malink (2013), following Michael Frede for the view that
they are the same. There has been a vast literature on the dictum de omni et nullo and its
importance for understanding the perfect syllogisms, the details of which are not essential
to the present argument. See also Patterson (1993); Ebert (2015); Marion and Rückert (2016);
Crubellier et al. (2019).
47This view has been discredited by Mignucci (2000); Malink (2009); Corkum (2015). See
Crager (2015) for a version of the Corcoran/Barnes reading that does not use the Fregean
conception of predication.
48For an influential mereological reconstruction of set theory, see Lewis (1991).
49See Stekeler-Weithofer (1986); Mignucci (2000); Malink (2009); Corkum (2015). This was
also the view of the ancient commentators: Alex Aphr in APr 25.24, Phlp in APr 47.23-48.2,
73.2-23, 104.11-16, 164.47.
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to all”) as equivalent to “is in as a whole” (APr 24b26-8) and his terms
for different kinds of propositions “universal” (katholou) and “particular”
(kata meros or en merei) are themselves derived from the language of whole
(holon) and part (meros). While this point alone might seem to be decisive,
one might wonder whether the terminology is meant seriously or is just a
metaphor. Without knowing what kind of philosophical or logical work it
does, this claim cannot be evaluated. 2) When discussing the genus-species
relation, Aristotle frequently refers to their relation as one of whole and
part (Metaph V.25, 26).50 This point seems to have the drawback that it
gives no clear reason to think “All swans are white” is true, since that is not
a species-genus relation. 3) The minimal formal structure of the part-whole
relation is sufficient for giving semantic clauses for all the syllogistic propo-
sitions and defining a consequence relation that is sound and complete for
his deductive system.51
Together, these pieces of evidence give good reason for attributing to
Aristotle the mereological conception of predication. 1 and 2 provide direct
textual support for Aristotle for thinking along these lines, while 3 shows
that the mereological conception is not merely metaphorical language but
can accomplish significant philosophical work for Aristotle’s logical the-
ory. With these points in place, we can respond to the objection that “All
swans are white” does not seem to capture a mereological relation. While
it certainly is not a species-genus relation, Aristotle explicitly says that it is
equivalent to the claim that “Swan is in white as a whole” (see 1 above).
Secondly, this equivalence does logical work, since it explains why, e.g.,
“All swans are colored” follows from it and “All white things are colored”,
viz the transitivity of part-hood. Finally, it is worth remembering that the
Platonic notion of part-hood is also broader than the species-genus relation,
since the Statesman passage above clearly shows that there are cases of parts
that are not kinds. The Platonic and the Aristotelian mereologies of kinds
agree on this point. Thus both Plato and Aristotle would agree that “All
swans are white” is a mereological claim, because for them the part-whole
relation between kinds is more inclusive than the species-genus relation.
This shows that both Platonic division and Aristotelian syllogistic are in
the business of investigating mereological claims between kinds. Thus, in
addition to being similar ways of investigation (namely, general and rigor-




4 Resolving the Puzzle
Let us return to our original puzzle: why did Aristotle compare division
with the syllogistic when these are such different methods? In the previous
sections I showed how these methods were both meant to contribute to
general, rigorous scientific methods aimed at understanding mereological
relations between kinds. This common project makes sense of Aristotle’s
comparison. Even though the goal and methods are very different, they
were both intended to be general and rigorous ways of attaining scientific
knowledge (§2). Despite the fact that the syllogistic yields quantificational
claims and division definitions, both investigate the mereological relations
between kinds (§3).
The foregoing similarities between division and syllogistic as general,
rigorous methods investigating mereological relations between kinds ex-
plain why Aristotle can criticize the method of division in the way that
he does. Although he thinks that division is successful when it comes
to searching for essences, it is not successful at demonstrating anything,
with the exception of disjunctive propositions devoid of scientific interest.
Aristotle’s syllogistic, by contrast, can demonstrate everything of scientific
interest that can be demonstrated. If one only has scientific knowledge
(ἐπισ0τήμη) when having a demonstration, this shows a weakness of divi-
sion, since this was its goal. Of course, division could still make a substan-
tial contribution to this goal, even if it does not reach the final step by itself.
Syllogistic, on the other hand, requires definitions as inputs (43b1-9). See-
ing the scientific project common to both allows us to appreciate why this
is a weakness in division that the defenders of division should take seri-
ously. The argument relies on central Aristotelian premises, especially that
scientific knowledge requires demonstrations and that a demonstration is
a certain kind of syllogism. These premises, however, while controversial,
are nevertheless fair game. This is because Aristotle has independent mo-
tivations for them, stemming from his observations of successful scientific
practice as well as general considerations of the nature of explanation.
The problem remains, however, that Aristotle is treating division in the
chapter as a putative demonstration and thus a syllogism, which despite
this common project still seems uncharitable on his part. That is, instead
of having some neutral background to assess both methods, Aristotle takes
the syllogism in these passages to be the standard against which division
is evaluated and division seems to be criticized precisely for not being a
syllogism. In what follows, I will argue that Aristotle’s important points
in the chapter do not rely on these claims and in a connected passage al-
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ready discussed (APo 91b32-35), Aristotle in fact acknowledges that the
mere fact that division isn’t syllogistic is not sufficient to show that it is
not scientifically valuable. Rather, his strategy in the chapter is to show
the limitations of division and the power of syllogistic within the common
project—points that could be appreciated even bracketing the question of
division’s demonstrative character.
Doing so will show exactly how Confusion can be avoided. Aristotle
assimilates division to syllogistic here not because he is confused about the
differences between them, which he is clear about, for instance, in APo II.5.
When Aristotle says that his opponents think that divisions are demonstra-
tions, we should understand him to be using “demonstration” in his usual
technical sense and thus claiming that his predecessors were wrong about
the potential of division. In particular, they were wrong to think that one
could achieve scientific knowledge with only division and without the syl-
logistic. But this need not be the result of any confusion on the part of the
Platonists either because the criticisms that Aristotle levels against them
all concern their common scientific project. Even if we suppose that Aris-
totle is right, their mistake was the very non-obvious one that deductive
arguments play a special role in science.
Identifying division and syllogistic allows Aristotle to straightfor-
wardly ask the question whether division can make the same contributions
to science that Aristotle has just claimed syllogistic can make. By seeing
that it cannot play the syllogistic’s role, however, Aristotle need not and
does not conclude that division thereby plays no role whatsoever. In I.31,
Aristotle does not set out to show that only the syllogistic, and not division,
is a necessary part of the scientific enterprise. This is important, because
Aristotle seems to accept the use of division in any science:
But it is necessary, whenever one is dealing with some whole, to
divide the genus into the indivisibles in species... (APo 96b15-
16)52
Divisions according to the differences are useful for going about
in this way [i.e. investigating the essence]. (APo 96b25-26)53
Aristotle also wants division to be rigorous, since he argues that:
Further, only in this way [i.e. using the rules for division that
he described] is it possible to leave nothing out in the what it is
52Χρὴ δέ, ὅταν ὅλον τι πραγματεύηταί τις, διελεῖν τὸ γένος εἰς τὰ ἄτομα τῷ εἴδει...
53αἱ δὲ διαιρέσ=εις αἱ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς χρήσ=ιμοί εἰσ=ιν εἰς τὸ οὕτω μετιέναι·
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[the essence]. (APo 96b35-97a1)54
These texts strongly suggest that Aristotle does not reject division as Plato
conceives of it. What Aristotle wants to do in I.31 is highlight the most im-
portant feature of arguments produced by the syllogistic method: validity.55
Let’s return to his criticisms once more:
1. Divisions are not deductions of the definitions they seek, because the
definition does not follow of necessity from the assumptions. (46a31-
b25)
2. Division cannot demolish. (46b26)
3. Division cannot deduce features that are not definitional. (46b27-8)
4. Division is useless in solving open problems. (46b28-35)
Each of these corresponds to an innovative feature of the syllogistic:
1. The syllogistic leads to arguments whose conclusions follow from the
premises of necessity.
2. The syllogistic allows one to refute a claim, since a refutation is just a
syllogism of the contradictory of a given claim. (42b40 ff)
3. The syllogistic can be used in all sorts of problems, not just defini-
tional ones.
4. The syllogistic can be used in situations of ignorance.
The most important of these features to Aristotle seems to be the first. He
isolated a notion of following of necessity in his account of the syllogism and
developed a method that leads to arguments that must have this property.
As was argued in §1.3, these precise claims are the route to understanding
why division is like a “weak syllogism” and a small part of the syllogis-
tic method. The syllogism is weak because it is unable to force its desired
conclusion, but instead only a disjunctive conclusion. This weakness of the
syllogism in turn implies that division is “a small part” of the syllogistic
method.
54῎Ετι πρὸς τὸ μηδὲν παραλιπεῖν ἐν τῷ τί ἐσ=τιν οὕτω μόνως ἐνδέχεται.
55Not every argument produced by the syllogistic method will be sound, since it is possi-
ble to choose one’s premises in accordance with opinion when doing dialectic, but these may
not be true.
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Aristotle is not claiming that there is a problem with division per se not
leading to such arguments. However, the three applications he then dis-
cusses (refutation, non-definitional problems, and situations of ignorance)
are all better served by syllogistic than division because it produces valid
arguments. Valid arguments can be used to establish or refute any sort of
claim whatsoever, unlike division, which can only plausibly be used to es-
tablish definitions. Many claims in science are not definitional, so it would
be important to say something about them. In a situation of ignorance, a
valid argument can allow the reasoner to put together pieces of knowledge
that she already had to find out something she before did not. Division,
even if it is illuminating, requires that the inquirer know at every point in
the division where to put the target kind. Otherwise, she is stuck. Syllo-
gisms, because they involve putting together multiple independent claims
in new ways, can lead to new, surprising results.
More generally, valid arguments are important in both dialectical en-
counters and scientific demonstration. In dialectical encounters, it is useful
to be able to force a conclusion on an interlocutor, for instance, to refute
her. Using division, like using an inductive argument, cannot sway a recal-
citrant opponent with the same force as a valid argument. Part of what it is
to know p scientifically, according to Aristotle, is to know that p is necessary.
If this is the case and there is some plausible way to know that certain fun-
damental principles of a science are necessary, then valid argumentation
will be of great use in coming to know derivative scientific truths, since the
necessary consequences of a set of necessary truths are themselves neces-
sary.
Note, however, that while syllogistic is useful in science, it also cannot
be the whole story. It cannot be used to demonstrate these first principles,
since those are precisely what must be taken for granted. One particularly
important kind of indemonstrable principle, for Aristotle, is the definition
(APo I.2). Here, it seems, is where Aristotle thinks division can be of service.
Because it is non-demonstrative, inquirers can use division to hunt for and
establish the definition of a target kind (APo II.13).
This is where Knowledge went wrong. Recall that, according to
Knowledge, division could not be a way of acquiring knowledge because
it is not possible to use question-begging arguments for acquiring knowl-
edge. On the view suggested here, division’s power is, paradoxically, also
its weakness. It is a bad way of acquiring certain kinds of knowledge be-
cause it is not a syllogism and thus not a demonstration. But knowledge
cannot always be got through demonstrations (APo I.3). Indeed, Plato de-
signed the method of division to hunt for definitions, one of the three kinds
34
of indemonstrable principle in Aristotle’s philosophy of science. Thus
nothing in APr I.31 rules out division being of crucial importance in attain-
ing such knowledge. In the end, Aristotle will argue that division is quite
important in discovering the internal structure of essences. In APo II.5 and
13, passages closely connected to APr I.31 (see 91b14-15, 96b26-7 for back
references), Aristotle affirms the utility of division for hunting essences, in
particular, by determining the correct order of the elements of a definition:
Divisions according to differences are useful for proceeding in
this way [hunting essences]. How they show has been said ear-
lier. But they could be useful for syllogizing the “what it is” in
this way alone. And they might be thought to be of no use at
all, but straightaway to assume everything, just as if someone
assumed at the beginning without the division. But the order
in which the predicates are predicated makes a difference, e.g.
animal tame biped or biped animal tame. (APo 96b25-32)56
Here is not the place to say why Aristotle deems this so important—suffice
it to say that he does. Aristotle’s affirmation of the utility of division in this
endeavor is consistent with his claim in APr I.31 that division is not useful
for the things that it seemed most fitted to (46b35-6), since in the context of
that discussion, Aristotle is restricting his attention to the use of division
for deducing particular elements in the definition, claiming (correctly) that
it cannot do that.
This positive role also explains why Aristotle stresses that his predeces-
sors were wrong to call division a demonstration of the essence: because it
is so important that division is not demonstrative in his sense. He sets up
his predecessors as insensitive to the difference, so that when he makes the
distinction between them, it shows up as a significant advance. This point
is supported by APo II.5, where, immediately after repeating the APr I.31
criticisms of division, he claims that it would not be strange at all if division
made the essence known in another way, as induction does.
Now we are in a position to see why Aristotle makes the strong claims
that he does. His opponents are insensitive to the fundamental Aristotelian
distinction between what is and what is not known by demonstration.
56αἱ δὲ διαιρέσ=εις αἱ κατὰ τὰς διαφορὰς χρήσ=ιμοί εἰσ=ιν εἰς τὸ οὕτω μετιέναι· ὡς μέντοι
δεικνύουσ=ιν, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς πρότερον. χρήσ=ιμοι δ’ ἂν εἶεν ὧδε μόνον πρὸς τὸ σ=υλλογίζεσ=-
θαι τὸ τί ἐσ=τιν. καίτοι δόξειέν γ’ ἂν οὐδέν, ἀλλ’ εὐθὺς λαμβάνειν ἅπαντα, ὥσ=περ ἂν εἰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ἐλάμβανέ τις ἄνευ τῆς διαιρέσ=εως. διαφέρει δέ τι τὸ πρῶτον καὶ ὕσ=τερον τῶν κατηγορουμένων
κατηγορεῖσ=θαι, οἷον εἰπεῖν ζῷον ἥμερον δίπουν ἢ δίπουν ζῷον ἥμερον.
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While Aristotle and the “Platonists” broadly agree about the need for gen-
erality and rigor in investigating mereological relations between kinds,
they disagree about what is necessary to fill that role. And while division
is an important part of the Aristotelian story, he has good reason to think
that it isn’t the whole story. He presents his opponents as thinking division
is a demonstration because that provides a foil to make clear just how useful
his proposed method is for the larger scientific project.
The interpretation of I.31 on offer gives Aristotle a clear, important point
to be making in his critical comparison between division and the syllogis-
tic. Through it, Aristotle also gives an unexpected explanation of the im-
portance of a central logical notion: validity. It is equally important, how-
ever, to see how Aristotle situated this explanation. The method of division
proves to be a helpful foil precisely because it shares so much of what else
Aristotle thinks is important about his method: its generality, rigor, and
ability to yield claims about the mereological relations between kinds.
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